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The global financial crisis and the
governance of financial institutions
Professor John H Farrar*
The global financial crisis has presented many regulatory challenges as
jurisdictions struggle to effectively address systemic risk. This article, which
constituted a plenary address at the Corporate Law Teachers Association
Conference, 2010, traverses the range of regulatory measures that have
been implemented in the corporate governance and prudential risk
management fields with a focus upon developments in Australia, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom.
The global financial crisis has challenged many of our assumptions about the
financial system.1 In the last decade or so we have seen the re-organisation and
transformation of the financial services sector2 and the rise of the so-called
masters of the universe3 who have commanded enormous rewards for
exposing others to great risks.4 We had assumed that in spite of market
fluctuations, management basically understood their businesses, lines of
authority were clear and followed, and adequate risk management systems and
other internal controls were in place. The present crisis has shown that on the
contrary this was not necessarily so. Banking is an industry which has failed
* Emeritus Professor of Law, Bond University and Professor of Corporate Governance,
University of Auckland; Joint Director of the New Zealand Governance Centre. The author
wishes to thank Dr John Laker, Chair of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority for
comments and corrections of an earlier draft. The author also benefited from discussions
with Simeon Moore and Pieter Joubert. Any remaining errors are, however, the
responsibility of the author.
1 See H Paulson Jr, On the Brink — Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global
Financial System, Business Plus, New York, 2010; R Barbera, The Cost of Capitalism,
McGraw Hill, New York, 2009; P Mason, Meltdown The End of the Age of Greed, Verso,
London, 2009; W Munchau, The Meltdown Years — The Unfolding of the Global Economic
Crisis, McGraw Hill, New York, 2010; J Stiglitz, Freefall — Free Markets and the Sinking
of the Global Economy, Allen Lane, London, 2010; S Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Complexity in
Financial Markets’ (2009) 87 Wash UL Rev 211; ‘Understanding the Subprime Financial
Crisis’ (2008–2009) 60 SCL Rev 549; ‘Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown’ (2008–2009) 93 Minn L Rev 373; J Farrar, L Parsons and
P Joubert, ‘The Development of an Appropriate Regulatory Response to the Global
Financial Crisis’ (2009) 21 Bond L Rev 1; the Special Issue of the University of New South
Wales Law Journal 2009, Vol 32, No 2, especially M Legg and J Harris, ‘How the American
Dream Became a Global Nightmare: An Analysis of the Causes of the Global Financial
Crisis’ (2009) 32 UNSWLJ 350; P Vasudev, ‘Credit Derivatives and Risk Management:
Corporate Governance in the Sarbanes-Oxley World’ [2009] JBL 331.
2 See R Baxt, A Black and P Hanrahan, Securities and Financial Services Law, 7th ed,
LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2008, Ch 1; G Pearson, Financial Services Law and
Compliance in Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2009, 2.2.
3 Based on the TV series and film. A more phallic expression was used in the industry and by
M Lewis, Liars’ Poker — Two Cities, True Greed, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1989.
4 See R Garnaut, The Great Crash of 2008, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2009.
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the global economy.5 Banks have given credit to anyone who wanted it. They
have failed to handle risk effectively. Instead of expediting the flow of capital
to industry they have frozen it. As The Economist’s special report on
international banking of 16 May 2009 said:
the costs of this failure are massive. Frantic efforts by governments to save their
financial systems and buoy their economies will do long-term damage to public
finances. The IMF reckons that average government debt for the richer G20
countries will exceed 100% of GDP in 2014, up from 70% in 2000 and just 40% in
1980.6
The market capitalisation of banks fell substantially, precipitating a significant
decline in stock markets around the world,7 and we are still picking up the
wreckage.
The governance of financial institutions
Light-handed regulation of the financial sector in the United States and United
Kingdom and its intellectual underpinnings have come in for strong criticism,8
and we are likely to see an international move for stronger regulation of the
sector. It is arguable that in Australia we have had a stronger system of
regulation since theAustralian Prudential RegulationAuthority (APRA) found
its feet after the HIH collapse. Australia certainly has on paper the toughest
company and securities law, tempered in the past by erratic enforcement.
Included in the current debates over the global financial crisis is a
discussion of the role of governance and particularly the corporate governance
of financial institutions. The following is a diagram showing the role of key
players in the governance of financial institutions:
5 ‘Rebuilding the banks’, The Economist, 16 May 2009, A Special Report on International
Banking, p 3. Australia and Canada were spared catastrophe for reasons which we will
consider later.
6 Ibid.
7 Garnaut, above n 4, p 98.
8 See, for instance, Garnaut, above n 4, pp 75ff.
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Taken from Table 1.2, ‘Partnership in Corporate Governance of Banks’ in H van
Greuning and S Brajovic Bratanovic, Analyzing Bank Risk — A Framework for
Assessing Corporate Governance and Risk Management, 3rd ed, the World Bank,
Washington, DC, 2009.
Lord Myners, the former UK Minister for the City, said in an interview in
the Sunday Times:
I think regulation is one aspect of enhancing confidence in financial institutions.
Others include self-healing through improved governance, more effective boards,
more considered analysis of incentive plans and the behaviours they will produce,
and stronger capital. There isn’t a single silver bullet here, regulation in itself
The GFC and the governance of financial institutions 229
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without support of those other features will lead to a potential frustration of
innovation and probably higher cost of funding.9
Major financial institutions are usually, although not necessarily, listed
companies which are subject to the normal rules of corporate governance.
The Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council’s
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations recommend that:
• a majority of the board should consist of independent directors, with
an independent chair;
• the board should implement risk management policies and systems,
which can be through an audit committee, a risk management
committee or another relevant committee; and
• there should be a remuneration committee with appropriate policies.
APRA adopted Prudential Standard APS 510 for the governance of
authorised deposit-taking institutions and Prudential Standard GPS 510 for the
governance of general insurers in May 2006. These have been amended with
effect from 1April 2010. APRAwill also be updating Prudential Standard LPS
510 for the governance of life insurers, with effect from July 2010. The New
Zealand Principles of Corporate Governance and Guidelines adopt a more
principle-based approach with accompanying guidelines. These are less
detailed.
The governance of financial institutions follows the general approach but
also has some distinctive characteristics,10 and as we shall see there are now
arguments being made internationally for a stricter regime as a result of the
global financial crisis — some of which are being implemented in Australia.
Regulators cannot prevent failures, but maintain a crucial role as facilitators.
They also act by enhancing and monitoring governance systems, particularly
with regard to risk management. Shareholders appoint the directors who set
the strategic direction and monitor management. Management must be fit and
proper people in the sense of ethics and competence. Audit committees, risk
management processes and internal audit are important elements as are
external auditors.
The modern approach to corporate governance has been a symbiosis of law
and self-regulation with increased emphasis on the latter in the last 20 years.11
In spite of this we have had major corporate collapses like Enron, WorldCom
and HIH, which had all the bells and whistles of corporate governance, and
now the global financial crisis. Does this mean that the system of corporate
9 Interview with A Davidson, ‘Paul Myners, The City’s middle man’, The Sunday Times,
12 October 2008.
10 See M Ariff and M Hoque, ‘Corporate Governance: the Case of Australian Banks’ in B E
Gup (Ed), Corporate Governance in Banking: A Global Perspective, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham 2007, p 210; H Van Greuning and S Bratanovic, Analyzing Bank Risk —
A Framework for Assessing Corporate Governance and Risk Management, 3rd ed, the
World Bank, Washington, DC, 2009.
11 See J Farrar, Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles and Policies, 3rd ed, Oxford
University Press, Melbourne, 2008, Ch 1 and J du Plessis, J McConvill and M Bagaric,
Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance, Cambridge University Press,
Melbourne, 2005, Ch 6.
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governance has also failed?12 A key element in the system of corporate
governance is the use of independent directors and most systems require a
majority of independent directors for listed companies.13 Now as a result of
the global financial crisis people are beginning to question this and to argue
that inexperienced non-executive directors facilitated bank failure.14 Another
important element in modern corporate governance is the use of specialist
board committees. Key committees are the Audit and Risk Management
committees. People have begun to question what use these committees have
been in the present crisis.
A threshold definitional question is whether ‘financial institution’ and
‘institutional investor’15 mean the same thing. Financial institutions are of
three major types — deposit-taking institutions, insurance companies and
pension funds, and brokers, underwriters and investment funds. Institutional
investors normally refer to banks, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual
funds and hedge funds. It can be seen from this that there is substantial overlap
between the two categories. In the past, the emphasis has been more on the
role of institutional investors in the scheme of corporate governance of listed
companies.16 Only recently have people begun to question the governance of
the financial institutions themselves and their organisation and relationships.17
Such a debate has been long overdue.
An important question in corporate governance is whether one size fits all?
It can be argued that one size does not fit all and that financial institutions are
sui generis and require distinctive corporate governance quite apart from the
issue of prudential regulation. It is obvious that there are differences between
listed and unlisted companies18 and that most systems have concentrated on
listed companies. Only recently has some attention been given to the
governance of small and medium-sized enterprises.19 In the past, people have
emphasised the differences between financial and non-financial companies,
although at the time of the American Law Institute’s corporate governance
project this distinction was rejected.20 One of the reasons to disagree with that
approach is the rise of financial conglomerates,21 which has been marked by
the emphasis on contract and the decline of the fiduciary concept with the
12 See D Branson, ‘Enron — When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to
Corporate Governance Reform’ (2003) 48 Villanova L Rev 989.
13 See Farrar, above n 11, pp 391ff.
14 See D Kershaw, ‘Rebuilding Confidence in the Governance of Financial Institutions’, LSE
Powerpoints, at <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/projects/lfm/Kershaw%20-
%20Rebuilding%20Confidence%20in%20Governance%20of%20Financial%20Institutions.
pdf> (accessed 30 June 2010).
15 Compare Farrar, above n 11, Ch 26.
16 Farrar, above n 11, pp 369ff.
17 See, eg, J Farrar and K Levy, ‘The Governance of Superannuation Funds’ in J Farrar and S
Watson (Eds), Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance, Centre for Commercial and
Corporate Law, University of Canterbury, 2010.
18 See H Manne, ‘Our Two Corporation Law Systems: Law and Economics’ (1967) 53 Virginia
L Rev 53.
19 See J Farrar, ‘The Governance of SMEs and Unlisted Companies’ (2008) 4 NZBLQ 213.
20 American Law Institute (ALI), Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations, Philadelphia, 1992, pp 180, 211.
21 Ibid, p 211. See APRA Discussion Paper, Supervision of Conglomerate Groups, 18 March
2010.
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demise of relationship banking. On the other hand, in Australia the approach
in relation to superannuation has been a mandatory trust regime coupled with
financial services disclosure. This looks good on paper, and in fact gives rise
to a lot of paper, but arguably ultimately represents a paper tiger and rewards
a financial oligopoly which has captured the process and achieves generous
remuneration irrespective of performance.22A second reason is that the boards
of financial institutions face more pressure to satisfy non-shareholder
stakeholders than the boards of non-financial firms. Third, financial
institutions are regulated by several different regulators. The second and third
points have been made by Professor Rene´e Adams of the University of
Queensland in a very useful paper, Governance and the Financial Crisis.23
Her overall conclusions using US data are that the governance of financial
institutions is on average not obviously worse than non-financial firms, and
that bank directors earned significantly less compensation than their
counterparts in non-financial firms. Her data is complex but perhaps indicates
that it is difficult to speak in general terms and that one needs to make specific
comparisons. Firm size is a very relevant factor. Also, executive remuneration
is a more significant matter on which to concentrate rather than director
compensation. Her paper is to be welcomed and demonstrates the need for
more detailed research in this area.
The role and composition of the board of directors
One of the perennial problems of corporate governance for any kind of
company is the ambiguous role of the board of directors.24 The original role
was to manage the company but the modern tendency is to refer to the role as
being to manage, supervise or monitor management.25 The term monitoring
was first used in relation to financial institutions in the United States but it has
been extended to companies generally.26 A key element in the monitoring is
the role of independent directors and board committees.
The first requirement of independent directors came in Section 10 of the US
Investment Company Act 1940 which provides that not more than 60% of the
directors of a registered investment company may be interested persons. In the
same year the SEC recommended that corporations form committees
composed of independent directors, but no regulatory action was taken until
1972 with a release in respect of audit committees composed of outside
directors.27
The definition of independent directors has tended to exclude people with
22 See Farrar and Levy, above n 17.
23 ECGI Finance, Working Paper No 248/2009.
24 See Farrar, above n 11, Ch 8; du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric, above n 11, pp 54ff.
25 Du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric, above n 11, at 94.
26 See M Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation — A Legal Analysis, Little Brown & Co,
Boston, 1976, pp 140ff, 162ff; the ALI, above n 20, p 111.
27 See R Karmel, ‘The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?’ in G Birrell et
al (Eds), The American Law Institute and Corporate Governance: An Analysis and Critique,
National Centre for the Public Interest, 1987, p 193. For the effect of this in the United
States, see J Gordon, ‘The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005:
of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices’ (2007) 59 Stanford L Rev 1465. For
Australia, see Farrar, above n 11, pp 391–6.
232 (2010) 24 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 27 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Wed Jul 14 13:08:51 2010
/journals/journal/ajcl/vol24pt3/part_3
specialist knowledge of the companies’ affairs and some argue as a
consequence against having a majority of independent directors on a listed
company board.28 Recent UK research has examined the question of whether
inexperienced non-executive directors facilitated bank failure and the
necessity for government bail-outs.29
APRA’s Prudential Standard APS 510 for the governance of authorised
deposit-taking institutions and Prudential Standard GPS 510 for the
governance of general insurers provide detailed requirements regarding
boards and senior management. The board must have a majority of
independent directors at all times and the chairperson must be an independent
director. A majority of directors present and eligible to vote at all board
meetings must be non-executive. The chairperson must not have been the
Chief Executive Officer of the institution at any time during the previous
3 years. Rule 7 of APS 510 and Rule 8 of GPS 510 provide that the board must
ensure that directors and senior management of the regulated institution,
collectively, have the full range of skills needed for the effective and prudent
operation of the regulated institution, and that each director has skills that
allow them to make an effective contribution to board deliberations and
processes. This includes the requirement for directors, collectively, to have the
necessary skills, knowledge and experience to understand the risks of the
regulated institution, including its legal and prudential obligations, and to
ensure that the regulated institution is managed in an appropriate way taking
into account these risks. This does not preclude the board from supplementing
its skills and knowledge through the use of external consultants and experts.
The UK Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks And Other
Financial Industry Entities of 16 July 200930 makes useful recommendations
with regard to board size, composition and compensation. It recommends that
non-executive directors should have the knowledge and understanding of the
business to enable them to contribute effectively.31 To this end they should be
provided with a personalised approach to induction, training and development
which is kept under review.32 Non-executive directors should have access to
dedicated support.33 It should be expected that they will give greater time
commitment than has been normal in the past.34 The Financial Services
Authority has ongoing supervisory responsibilities and the review suggests
that they should give closer attention to both the overall balance of the board
in relation to risk strategy and the extent of training provided for them.35
28 See, eg, N Wolfson, The Modern Corporation — Free Markets Versus Regulation, The Free
Press, NY, 1984, p 83; the authors in Birrell et al, above n 27, and the arguments in Farrar,
above n 11, pp 391–6. See also du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric, above n 11, at 323ff.
29 See Kershaw, above n 14.
30 United Kingdom, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial
Industry Entities: Final Recommendations, November 2009, Ch 3. As to board size in
Australia and the split between executive and independent directors, see Ariff and Hoque,
above n 10, pp 224–5.
31 A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities:
Final Recommendations, p 43.
32 Ibid, p 43.
33 Ibid, p 44.
34 Ibid, p 45.
35 Ibid, p 47.
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Non-executive directors should be ready, able and encouraged to challenge
proposals on strategy put forward by the executives.36 The chair should be
expected to commit a substantial proportion of time, probably not less than
two thirds, to the business of the institution.37 The chair should have a
combination of financial industry experience and a proven track record of
leadership.38 The chair should be elected on an annual basis.39 The review also
considers the role of the senior independent director as a sounding board for
the chair.40 The board should undertake regular evaluation of its
performance.41
The duty of care, liquidity and risk management
From time to time there has been an argument for an increased duty and
standard of care on directors of financial institutions.42 This kind of argument
was raised in the United States in the early twentieth century but was
rejected.43 As long ago as 1946 Professor H Ballantine thought that a
distinction based solely on the label ‘financial’ as opposed to ‘industrial’
corporation was unjustified and anachronistic,44 and the American Law
Institute took the same view in 1992.45 It said that ‘in general, today banks and
other financial institutions are often complex economic entities with activities
far wider than the holding of deposits. Industrial corporations often are, at
least in part, financial institutions.’46 Nevertheless the argument has recently
been restated.47
The two main arguments for stricter rules for bank directors are first the role
of banks in providing access to credit and its importance in the economy48
and, second, the special vulnerability of the banking industry and the
significance of banking failure for the economy as a whole.49 Banks have a
special role in respect of liquidity. By holding illiquid assets and issuing liquid
liabilities they create liquidity for the economy and are peculiarly susceptible
to a bank run.50 This extreme behaviour, which represents a classic prisoner’s
dilemma,51 can cause the failure of even a solvent bank. As J M Keynes wrote:
36 Ibid, p 51.
37 Ibid, p 58.
38 Ibid, p 54.
39 Ibid, p 55.
40 Ibid, p 56.
41 Ibid, p 57.
42 See M Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations and other Business Organizations,
8th ed, Foundation Press, New York, 2000, pp 535–6.
43 See ALI, above n 20, p 211. See also Atherton v FDIC 519 US 213 (1997).
44 Law of Corporations, rev ed, Callaghan, Chicago, 1946, para 63a.
45 Above n 43.
46 Ibid.
47 J Macey and M O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, FRBNY Economic Policy
Review, April 2003, p 91.
48 A Busch, Banking Regulation and Globalization, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009,
p 23. For other arguments based on asymmetric information, unsophisticated asset holders,
dynamic instability and contagion, see J Stanford and T Beale, The Law and Economics of
Financial Institutions in Australia, Butterworths, Sydney, 1995, pp 269ff.
49 Busch, ibid, pp 23–4.
50 Macey and O’Hara, above n 47, p 97.
51 Ibid.
234 (2010) 24 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
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‘Of the maxims of orthodox finance none, surely, is more antisocial than the
fetish of liquidity.’52 Added to these is a third argument that banks and other
financial institutions are often elaborate financial conglomerates which are
now different from industrial corporations in the western world. The old
argument is no longer true if it ever was.
Jonathan Macey and Maureen O’Hara argued in 2003 that financial
institution directors should be obliged to inform themselves of whether a
particular decision will: (1) impact the ability of the institution to pay its debts
as they fall due; (2) materially increase the riskiness of the institution; or
(3) materially reduce its capital position as measured both by a risk-based
calculation and the leverage test. This links care with liquidity and risk
management. This is in the context of what is often a complex or opaque
corporate structure.53 The current case law test is not that of a competent
operator in financial products and is of a more general nature but taking
account of the nature of the company’s business and its circumstances.54 This
falls short of the specifics of the proposed test. Financial institutions face
financial, market, human resources and other risks. It is the role of the board
and, in particular, the audit and risk management committees to monitor these
risks.
The Banking Risk Spectrum is shown below:
52 The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan St Martins Press,
London, 1936, p 155.
53 Macey and O’Hara, above n 47, p 102. Cf Eisenberg, above n 42, p 536. Cf Re Barings Plc
(No 5), Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Baker (No 5) [2000] 1 BCLC 523. See
also Dr John Laker, Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions — Some Remarks,
ABAC/ABA/PECC Symposium on Good Corporate Governance, Melbourne, 19 October
2005. This topic links with ‘fit and proper’ requirements and also unfitness under the UK
disqualification of director provisions. See also Bank for International Settlements, Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document, Principles for Enhancing
Corporate Governance, March 2010, Principles 2 and 12.
54 Laker, above n 53, pp 4ff. See also Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(1) and Companies Act
1993 (NZ) s 137. As to the relationship of liquidity to insolvency Sandell v Porter (1966)
115 CLR 666 at 670; 40 ALJR 71; BC6600670; Sandell, Pengulan Floor Coverings Pty Ltd
v Carter (1997) 24 ACSR 651; 193 LSJS 243; 15 ACLC 1293; BC9703643; Powell Duncan
(Noelex Yachts Aust) v Fryer (2001) 159 FLR 433; 37 ACSR 589; [2001] SASC (FC) 59;
BC200100756 and ASIC v Plymin (No 1) (2003) 175 FLR 124; 46 ACSR 126; [2003] VSC
123; BC200302080. The distinction seems to be drawn between temporary and endemic
lack of liquidity. In banking, liquidity means the ability to meet obligations when they
become due without incurring unacceptable losses. An important factor is the cost of
liquidity. Banks normally have more options available for maintaining liquidity unless there
is a banking crisis such as we have recently experienced.
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Table 2: The Banking Risk Spectrum
Financial Risks Operational Risks Environmental
Risks
Balance sheet structure Internal fraud Country and political
risks
Earnings and income
statement structure
External fraud Macroeconomic
policy
Capital adequacy Employment practices and
workplace safety
Financial
infrastructure
Credit Clients, products, and business
services
Legal infrastructure
Liquidity Damage to physical assets Banking crisis and
contagion
Market Business disruption and
system failures (technology
risks)
Interest rate Execution, delivery, and
process management
Currency
Taken from Table 1.1 ‘The Banking Risk Spectrum’ in H van Greuning and
S Brajovic Bratanovic, Analyzing Bank Risk — A Framework for Assessing
Corporate Governance and Risk Management, 3rd ed, the World Bank, Washington,
DC, 2009.
It is remarkable how little attention was paid to risk management in the
past. This may have been due to ownership patterns. Joint stock banks and
insurance companies were subject to some system of regulation but City of
London stock brokers had no real experience of risk management prior to Big
Bang.55 The Council of Lloyds also significantly failed to monitor insurance
risk.56 Merchant banks were complacent.
Barings was undone by a rogue trader, weak management and a lax
regulatory regime in the 1990s.57 Barings’ collapse caused most City of
London firms to formalise their risk management. Nevertheless it was the
beginning of the end of Gentlemanly Capitalism.58
The Final Report of the Royal Commission into the Tricontinental Group of
55 See PAugar, The Death of Gentlemanly Capitalism, Penguin Books, London, 2000, pp 96ff.
56 A Raphael, Ultimate Risk, Corgi Books, London, 1995, p 240.
57 Augar, above n 55, p 229.
58 Augar, above n 55.
236 (2010) 24 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
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Companies in Victoria on 31 August, 1962,59 made strong criticism of
Tricontinental’s management of credit risk and the Reserve Bank’s voluntary
prudential supervision.
Risk management was referred to by the Cadbury Report and in Australia
it was mainly thought of in relation to theAudit Committee.60 It received more
attention in the Australian Securities Exchange’s Corporate Governance
Council’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice
Recommendations, particularly in the revised version. The Australia/New
Zealand risk management standard was originally adopted in 1995 and was
revised in 2009 (AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009). APRA initially found it difficult
to deal with its insurance responsibilities and was slow off the mark in
responding to HIH’s difficulties. APRA was reformed with a full time
Executive Group in place of its previous board. In 2002 it introduced a
risk-based framework with two components — a Probability and Impact
Rating System (PAIRS) and a Supervisory Oversight and Response System
(SOARS). PAIRS deals with the riskiness of an institution, while SOARS
deals with how APRA officials respond to that risk. PAIRS deals with
probability and impact of failure and is based on qualitative data which results
in a risk score.61 Some concerns have been raised about the subjective aspects
of some of this process.62 This is where SOARS comes in and the actual level
of intervention is set by the Executive Group together with senior
management. APRA now tends to earlier and more interventionist action.63
The topic of risk management in banking was usefully discussed by Dr John
Laker, the Chair of APRA in 2006.64 He analysed the financial system risks in
two main categories — systemic risk which affects the financial system as a
whole, and non-systemic or diversifiable risk which is peculiar to a specific
institution.65
The challenge for prudential regulators such as APRA is to strike a balance
between financial safety and other public policy objectives such as efficiency
and competition.66 In the case of banking, APRA’s prudential framework is
based on the Basel accords which are currently undergoing revision. The first
accord in 1988 was a risk-based capital adequacy regime. In 2004, Basel II
59 Vol 1, p 281.
60 Philomena Leung et al, The Role of Internal Audit in Corporate Governance &
Management, RMIT Publishing, Melbourne, 2003, p 23 — explaining that 74% of internal
auditors regarded risk management as one of their most important functions.
61 See G Pearson, Financial Services Law and Compliance in Australia, Cambridge University
Press, Melbourne, 2009, at 2.3.2.4.
62 J Black, ‘Managing Regulatory Risks and Defining the Parameters of Blame: A Focus on the
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority’ (2006) 28 Law and Policy 8.
63 Pearson, above n 61, at 35.
64 Risk Management in Banking — A Prudential Perspective, 59 International Banking
Summer School, Melbourne, 6 September 2006. See also IMF, Financial Sector Assessment
Program, Australia. Detailed Assessment of Observance of Standards and Codes, October
2006, pp 26–7; APRA, Implementation of the Basel II Capital Framework Supervisory
Review Process, 21 December 2007; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles
for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision, September 2008; Consultative
Document, Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance, Principles 6–8. See Pearson,
above n 61, at 2.3.24 and 7.5.
65 Laker, above n 53, p 2. See also S Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’ (2008) 97 Georgetown LJ 193.
66 Laker, ibid, p 2.
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introduced new and more granular capital requirements which were more
sensitive to the actual risks within the bank’s business. Basically the greater
the risk to which the bank is exposed, the greater the amount of capital needed
to safeguard solvency and economic stability. The main problem in the present
crisis is to quantify exposure to derivative and credit default swap liability. As
Hank Paulson has written, ‘the devil was in the details — and the details were
murky’.67
Dr Laker emphasised that prudential regulators work on the fundamental
premise that the primary responsibility for financial soundness and prudential
risk management lies with the board of directors and senior management.68
This involves risk identification and risk mitigation and management. The
latter involves a variety of options including limiting the risks, pooling of
risks, diversification, hedging divestment of risk and insurance cover.69
Dr Laker discussed financial risk in terms of credit risk, traded market risk and
operational risk.70
An effective risk management regime must have the following
characteristics:
• Clearly defined management responsibilities and accountability;
• Avoidance of conflicts of interest;
• A system of approvals, limits and authorisation;
• An audit committee or risk management committee to maintain
internal control;
• Detailed risk controls for each business line;
• An effective system of internal audit or compliance process; and
• A cushion of unencumbered high quality liquid assets to withstand
high stress events, commensurate with the complexity of on-and
off-balance sheet activities.71 This needs to be under constant review
to keep pace with changes in the risk profile and the external risk
landscape. This is the subject of increasing prudential regulation.
APRA adopted Prudential Standard APS 110 on Capital Adequacy in
January 2008. This standard aims to ensure that authorised deposit-taking
institutions maintain adequate capital on both an individual and group basis to
act as a buffer against the risks involved in their activities. The key
requirements are that the institution must have Internal Capital Adequacy
Assessment Process; maintain minimum levels of capital; and inform APRA
of any significant adverse changes in capital. In addition, Prudential Standard
APS 111 deals with Capital Adequacy: Measurement of Capital. The key
requirements of this standard are that authorised deposit-taking institutions
must only include eligible capital as a component of capital for regulatory
capital purposes; deduct certain items from capital; and meet certain
limitations with regards to Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital. Guidance Note
AGN 210.1 deals with liquidity management strategy. These are being revised
67 Paulson, above n 1, p 46.
68 Laker, above n 53, p 3.
69 Ibid, p 5.
70 Ibid, pp 6–8.
71 Ibid, p 8. See the materials cited at n 64 above. See too Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, Principles for Sound Stress Testing Practices and Supervision, May 2009.
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in light of enhancements to the Basel II Framework. APRA recognises that the
scope of the liquidity management strategy may vary among institutions
depending on the nature and complexity of their operations. Prudential
Standard APS 116, also implemented in January 2008, deals with Capital
Adequacy: Market Risk and requires a framework to manage, measure and
monitor market risk commensurate with the nature, scale and complexity of
operations of the institutions.
In a recent IMFWorking Paper, Basel Core Principles and Bank Risk: Does
Compliance Matter? of March 2010, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Enrica
Detragiache consider whether compliance with Basel Core principles for
effective banking supervision is associated with lower bank risk, as measured
by Z-Scores. They find no evidence linking better compliance with improved
bank soundness. This is a worrying finding which may reflect the difficulty of
capturing bank risk using accounting measures.
Keynes distinguished between risk, to which numerical probability can be
assigned, and uncertainty.72 Uncertainty is the risk which cannot be calculated
with any degree of confidence. This relationship is less a dichotomy than a
spectrum. The topics of risk, uncertainty and regulation are the subject of an
interesting paper by Simeon Moore73 which is not yet published and are also
discussed by Judge Richard Posner in Ch 9 of his recent book, The Crisis of
Capitalist Democracy.74
US banks mispriced and misjudged risk, effectively outsourcing risk
assessment to credit rating agencies and gambling on a government bailout.
The regulators stood back and let it happen. It has been argued that Australian
banks have been better regulated.75 Certainly the sector has been subject to a
lot of regulation, but the fact that it has emerged from the current financial
crisis relatively unscathed may be due at least in part to timing and the fact
that Australian banks were less of an international player at the time than their
US, UK and European counterparts. This is a matter which needs further
detailed research before the above claim can be substantiated. One must guard
against the fallacy of post hoc propter hoc.
Remuneration issues
Even before the current crisis there has been growing investor dissatisfaction
with remuneration levels, particularly in the financial sector, and the lack of
correlation between pay and performance.76
APRA released its prudential requirements on the remuneration for
authorised deposit-taking institutions and general and life insurance
72 J Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, MacMillan, London; St Martin’s Press, New
York, 1921, Ch XXIV.
73 ‘Round and round the merry-go round: Shall the subprime mortgage crisis and consequential
credit crunch provide the economic stimulus required to finally cause the demise of the
“invisible hand approach” to market and market participant regulation’, Banking and
Finance Paper, Bond University 2009.
74 Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 2010.
75 See T D’Aloisio, Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, Asia Securities Forum,
Sydney, 12 October 2009, pp 13–14.
76 See L Bebchuk and J Fried, Pay Without Performance — The Unfulfilled Promise of
Executive Performance, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
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companies on 30 November 2009. The revised governance standards will
come into effect betweenApril and July 2010. By this date APRA requires that
a Capital Board Remuneration Committee with appropriate composition and
charter will be established and a suitable remuneration policy will be in place.
APRA’s requirements take as their starting point the Financial Stability
Board’s Principles for Sound Compensation Practices of April 2009. These
principles have been endorsed by the G20 leaders.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Consultative Document,
Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance, March 2010, Principle 11
provides:
An employee’s compensation should be effectively aligned with prudent risk taking:
compensation should be adjusted for all types of risk; compensation outcomes
should be symmetric with risk outcomes; compensation payout schedules should be
sensitive to the time horizon of risks; and the mix of cash, equity and other forms
of compensation should be consistent with risk alignment.
The UK review recommended that the remuneration committee of a
financial institution should have a remit extended to all aspects of
remuneration policy, with particular emphasis on risk.77 The report makes
detailed recommendations in respect of disclosure and provision for the
deferral of incentive payments to align rewards with sustainable
performance.78 There should be a dialogue between the remuneration
committee and the board risk management committee on an arm’s length basis
on specific risk adjustments applied to incentive packages.79 It also
recommends that if the non-binding resolution on a remuneration committee
report attracts less than 75% of the total votes cast, the chair of the committee
should stand for re-election in the following year.80
The matter has received some general attention by the recent report of the
Australian Productivity Commission.81 It recommends that the matter should
remain with boards and does not favour capping pay or introducing a binding
shareholder vote.82 Instead it favours independent remuneration committees
and improved processes for using outside consultants. It favours enhanced
disclosure and strengthening the consequences for boards that are
unresponsive to shareholder views.83 These are much tamer recommendations
than the UK report and APRA’s new standards.
In the United States and United Kingdom there are controversial moves to
tax bonuses, which are politically justifiable but may drive business away.
77 See above n 30, p 93.
78 Ibid, p 98.
79 Ibid, p 99.
80 Ibid, p 100.
81 Executive Remuneration in Australia, 19 December 2009.
82 Ibid, p xiv.
83 Ibid.
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Investor litigation
In the United States, United Kingdom and Germany there has already been
investor litigation arising out of the global financial crisis.84 Investor litigation
is normally only possible for shareholders and outside the United States most
national systems lack institutional incentives for such litigation. In the case of
depositors and other creditors there is contractual redress against the
institution but limitations on the ability to proceed against the directors. It has
been suggested from time to time that the fiduciary duties of directors can
extend to creditors when the company enters the zone of illiquidity and
insolvency.85 Sometimes this has been put in terms of a potential negligence
liability.86 In Canada, Singapore and Malaysia, the legislation gives some
locus standi to certain creditors as well as shareholders to bring a remedy for
oppression and unfairly prejudicial contact.87 In New Zealand this is not
possible, but in Australia, s 1324 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) confers
locus standi on a creditor in respect of a breach of the Act.88 So far this has
been relatively under-used.89
In the United States the Madoff frauds and subprime loans have given rise
to litigation, with some of it being through claims on the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation and others by indirect investor litigation,90 although
recently there has been a decline in securities fraud class actions.91
Issues before the English courts include claims by bondholders, structured
investment vehicle litigation, derivative claims in respect of Northern Rock
and claims for misleading and deceptive conduct in connection with issues of
securities.92
Claims in Germany include investors claiming against banks and
prospectus liability.93 Some of these cases are collective actions under the
Capital Markets Law of 2005.94
All of this represents increased investor activism and we are likely to see
more litigation of a similar nature in Australia and New Zealand. Directors of
84 See E Bruno (Ed), Global Financial Crisis — Navigating and Understanding the Regulatory
Aspects, Globe Business Publishing, London, 2009, pp 431, 447, 463.
85 See R Austin, H Ford and I Ramsay, Company Directors — Principles of Law and
Corporate Governance, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2005, pp 276ff.
86 Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd (in liq) (1985) 3 ACLC 453; [1985] 1 NZLR 242; (1985)
2 NZCLC 99,264.
87 See K McGuinness, Canadian Business Corporations Law, 2nd ed, LexisNexis, 2007,
at 13.79. Malaysia and Singapore adopted the Canadian provision in spite of adopting the
Australian Uniform Companies Act model.
88 See R Austin and I Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, 14th ed, LexisNexis,
2010, p 750.
89 L Thai, ‘Statutory Injunction — Call for amendment to s 1324 of the Corporations Act’
(2006) 24 C&SLJ 41 at 41.
90 See A Borrasso and H Lucas, ‘US securities litigation in the financial crisis’ in Bruno (Ed),
above n 84, p 463.
91 ‘Securities Suits Drop as Credit — Crunch Cases Dry Up, Study Shows’, BusinessWeek,
5 January 2010.
92 See C Canning and R Malone, ‘Securities and banking litigation arising out of the financial
crisis in the United Kingdom’ in Bruno (Ed), above n 84, p 447.
93 See F Herring and R Litten, ‘Litigation caused by the financial crisis in Germany’ in Bruno
(Ed), above n 84, p 431.
94 Ibid, p 443.
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financial institutions will need to consider carefully the scope of cover of their
D&O policies and there is likely to be litigation over this as well.95
The changing role of the state
An important question in respect of governance in general is the changing role
of the State in the present global financial crisis.96 In British Commonwealth
systems we have an archaic concept of the State in the form of the Crown, but
the reality of the modern state is multifunctional and complex. Historically the
State in Australia and New Zealand provided a major source of development
capital in the early history of the colonies. The State has been regulator of the
financial sector and now it is thrust into the position of equity investor in the
United States and United Kingdom.97 This has required new classes of shares
to be taken up by the State in what was intended to be a temporary measure.98
Then there is the role of Reserve Banks as lenders of last resort.99 In addition
to a possible changing role of the State there has been increased emphasis on
the international dimension and international approaches to the problems.100
There has been a need for closer international cooperation. Attention has been
focussed on the G20 countries and this has led to a reconstitution of the
Financial Stability Board and increased action by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) and other global standards-setting bodies.101
The crisis is not over and debate continues about a new system of
regulation. There will be a temptation to over-regulate the sector102 and one
needs to remember that the regulators themselves cannot escape some
responsibility for the crisis, and need themselves to be monitored.103 Some
argue that we are undergoing a paradigm shift.104 This is probably an
exaggeration and in any event when one is living through a period of crisis and
change it is difficult to detect whether the paradigm has shifted. As regards
95 See J McDonald Jr, ‘Similarities Between The Savings and Loan Crisis and Today’s Current
Financial Crisis: What the Past Can Tell Us About the Future’ (2009) 76 Defence Counsel
Jnl 470; M Legg and J Harris, ‘How the American Dream Became a Global Nightmare: An
Analysis of the Causes of the Global Financial Crisis’ (2009) 32 UNSWLJ 350 at 385–8.
96 See Farrar, Parsons and Joubert, above n 1, pp 12ff; P Alessandri and A Haldane, Banking
on the State, November 2009, a paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
12th Annual International Banking Conference, 25 September 2009.
97 See, for instance, P Mason, Meltdown: The End of the Age of Greed, Verso, London, 2009,
p 46. For the US position, see A Sorkin, Too Big to Fail — Inside the Battle to Save Wall
Street, Allen Lane, Camberwell, 2009.
98 The UK government took 57% of the Royal Bank of Scotland in return for injecting £15
billion equity and £5 billion of preference shares. It owns 43.5% of the merged HBOS and
Lloyds TSB: ‘3 board members of RBS and 2 of Lloyds/HBOS are appointed by the
government’, Daily Telegraph, 13 October 2008. The total cost to the UK taxpayer has
reached £850 billion. £107 million was paid to City advisers for advice. The latest absurdity
is the objection by the board of RBS to the politicisation of the bank: Guardian,
15 December 2009.
99 Farrar, Parsons, Joubert, above n 1, pp 14ff.
100 Ibid, pp 12, 18ff for a detailed discussion.
101 Ibid, pp 29ff.
102 Farrar, Parsons, Joubert, above n 1, pp 40–1.
103 R Posner, The Crisis of Capitalist Democracy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass,
2010, pp 173ff.
104 Farrar, Parsons, Joubert, above n 1, pp 40–1.
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corporate governance itself in Australia, we have the toughest but most obese
company and financial services law and superannuation regulation, as well as
detailed self-regulation. The problem is to make it work well without
impeding innovation and corporate performance.105
The problem for New Zealand is of a different nature. For 25 years it has
adopted a more libertarian regime which remarkably has survived changes of
government but which needs now to adjust to a different climate. It has a
Companies Act 1993 based on the North American model, an outdated
Securities Act 1978 and a principle-based system of self-regulation of
corporate governance. The powers of the Securities Commission are more
limited than the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and there
is no APRA. Prudential regulation remains with the Reserve Bank. Compared
with other jurisdictions, there is little effective enforcement of company law
or securities regulation,106 and the system of superannuation is substantially
privatised with little regulation.107 In the meantime the country’s GDP has
recently declined but is projected to recover.108 The present government faces
a complex challenge.109
Conclusion
The global financial crisis has challenged academic and conventional wisdom,
and may have caused the beginning of a dramatic shift in international
relations. The governance of financial institutions is part of that bigger picture.
Governance in the broad sense is open for debate — the role of the state,
international cooperation, the scope of prudential regulation, the role of boards
of directors and in particular risk management procedures and capital
adequacy requirements are all being questioned. In the past some research has
been done on the link between governance and performance.110 Perhaps the
present emphasis should be more on the link between good governance and
the avoidance of catastrophe.111 This discussion would be of particular
relevance to Australian financial institutions and regulators.
105 See Farrar, above n 11, p 572.
106 See J Farrar, ‘Enforcement: A Trans-Tasman Comparison’ (2005) NZ L Rev 383.
107 See T Keeper, ‘Governance of New Zealand Superannuation Schemes: A Mixed Scorecard’
in J Farrar and S Watson (Eds), Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance, Centre for
Commercial and Corporate Law, University of Canterbury, 2010.
108 See OECD New Zealand — Economic Outlook 87 Country Summary,
<http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3343,en_2649_34109_45270062_1_1_1_1,00.html>
(accessed 9 June 2010).
109 Answering the $64,000 Question — Closing the income gap with Australia by 2025, 1st
Report and Recommendations 2025 Taskforce, 30 November 2009.
110 See, for instance, R Brown and T Gorgens, Corporate Governance and Financial
Performance in an Australian Context, Treasury Working Paper 2009-02, March 2009.
111 Compare Stiglitz, above n 1, pp 153ff.
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